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be discussed to exemplify asymmet-
ric and hybrid tactics in warfare. 
Finally, national and international 
defense systems will be examined, 
from which recommendations to 
combat asymmetric and hybrid tac-
tics will be made.
Introduction    
     Though the terms “conflict” and 
“warfare” see interchangeable use 
in modern rhetoric, we must rec-
ognize the elevation of violence 
and destruction that warfare in-
volves. In making this distinction, 
we must also be wary of the biases 
introduced by traditional literature 
on warfare, assuming its state-like 
nature. “Conflict” can be framed by 
the clash of opposing blocs, sparked 
by ideological, territorial, or oth-
er disagreements. Conversely, we 
define “warfare” as “sustained, co-
ordinated violence between political 
organizations”.1 This definition pro-
vides a more flexible approach to 
warfare, and it emphasizes several 
components. First, war is violent. 
Warfare involves the use of force to 
kill people and wage destruction. 
This violence must be sustained to 
qualify as warfare, which is an ex-
clusionary factor when classifying 
something as a conflict or a war. 
Conflicts and disputes are common 
in international relations, but rare-
ly do they escalate to war; such an 
escalation would require violence, 
the use of force, and then sustaining 
this violence for a period of time.2 
A second component in identify-
ing war emphasizes the “between” 
in our definition. Violence must be 
reciprocated to qualify as war; thus 
we treat war as the outcome of the 
behavior of two or more actors.3 It 
is important to clarify that “actors” 
participate in war, not necessarily 
states. This paper emphasizes the 
role of non-state actors in both con-
flict and warfare, while criticizing 
the antiquated definitions of warfare 
In recent decades, the inter-national stage has witnessed warfare’s evolution away from 
conventional tactics. Whereas, his-
torically, rivaling nation-states du-
eled on rigid battlefields to deter-
mine a clear victor, modern tactics 
have blurred the lines between war 
and peace while also removing defi-
nite fronts, actors, and necessary 
capabilities. This is representative of 
contemporary asymmetric threats: 
generally used by weaker actors in 
conflict to exploit vulnerabilities in 
a more powerful opponent, they cir-
cumvent direct confrontation while 
being irregular and difficult to com-
bat. In unison with traditional war 
tactics, these asymmetric conflicts 
combine to form hybrid warfare. 
This paper will seek to define asym-
metric and hybrid threats, their sta-
tus-modeling conflict in the 21st 
century, and the actors, both state 
and non-state, that drive their use. 
Further, a variety of case studies will 
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that preclude such actors. 
     The concept of war is neither new 
nor uniform: warfare has long been 
subject to evolutionary forces and 
its existence has been defined ac-
cording to a variety of historical and 
present perspectives. Whereas the 
above definition approached war 
with a broad, non-state scope, much 
of historical and contemporary lit-
erature ignore such cases. Carl von 
Clausewitz, a Prussian general and 
military theorist active during the 
Napoleonic Wars, provided sever-
al definitions of warfare: once as 
“[the] continuation of policy by other 
means,” while later as “...nothing but 
a duel on an extensive scale” and “...
an act of violence intended to com-
pel our opponent to fulfill our will.”4 
Clausewitz’s implication of warfare 
as state-dominated was a product 
of conventional tactics prominent 
in his era. Nonetheless, to many, 
the prevailing perception of warfare 
is similarly conventional in nature. 
Military historian John Keegan pro-
posed this in his political-rational-
ist theory of war, saying “[warfare] 
is assumed to be an orderly affair in 
which states are involved, in which 
there are declared beginnings and 
ends, easily identifiable combatants, 
and high levels of obedience by sub-
ordinates.”5 Per Keegan, this theo-
ry deals poorly with non-state and 
non-conventional tactics, which is 
the subject of this paper.
     The rationalist theory finds 
company in academic literature. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a Genevan 
philosopher and enlightenment 
thinker, argued “war is a relation 
not between man and man but be-
tween state and state.”6 Even Web-
ster’s Dictionary, a supposed arbi-
trator of word usage, defines war as 
“a state of...conflict between states or 
nations.”7 Conventional warfare fits 
within these classifications: glob-
al security has historically evolved 
around the clashes of nation-states 
and their militaristic ventures. The 
end of the 20th century and notably 
the Cold War, however, has demon-
strated a dramatic shift in the sphere 
of conflict.  
     Witness to increasingly powerful 
nation-states with numerically ex-
travagant armies and weapon arse-
nals, pure conventional warfare has 
lost its position as a viable means 
of completing political goals. As of 
January 2019, the United States mil-
itary budget exceeded $700 billion 
dollars.8  Even accounting for infla-
tion, this exceeds the United States’ 
Cold War average by over $100 bil-
lion dollars.9 Boasting a military of 
this strength, conventional warfare 
with the United States is not a prac-
tical strategy. The disparity is blatant 
in the ongoing conflict in Iraq: in 
2019, Iraq’s military budget valued 
roughly $7.6 billion in US dollars, 
a fraction of the resources wield-
ed by the United States.10 As such, 
counters to U.S. offensive attacks 
(such as the assassination of Irani-
an commander Qassem Soleimani, 
which was itself asymmetrical) in-
clude frequent mass demonstrations 
and, more violently, a rocket attack 
on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 
11 In sum, warfare has been forced 
to adapt to the powers that partici-
pate in it. Nonetheless, warfare rep-
resents more than the individuals or 
weapons involved: it is the theater in 
which opposing values clash, and in 
modern society it has morphed into 
a path around the stalemate between 
powerful national armies.  
Definitions: Asymmetric 
Threats
     Referenced above, select na-
tion-states dominate military spend-
ing (and generally global conflict). 
A prominent example is the United 
States, whose national defense bud-
get constitutes nearly 40% of global 
military spending, while their al-
lies account for (roughly) another 
third.12 This accumulation of force 
proves counter to deterrent efforts: 
according to the Serbian Report of 
the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
released in May 1997, “U.S. domi-
nance in the conventional military 
arena may encourage adversaries 
to use such asymmetric means...”13 
Thus, the concept of asymmetric 
threats was introduced, proposed to 
“...avoid direct military confrontation 
with the United States,” and “disrupt 
the US command, control, commu-
nications, and intelligence networks, 
[and] deter allies...from supporting 
US intervention.”14 Steven Metz, an 
American national security expert 
at the U.S. Army War College,15 cri-
tiqued this nation-specific defini-
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tion and proposed a more complete 
definition of asymmetric strategy: 
“[in military affairs] asymmetry is 
acting, organizing, and thinking dif-
ferently than opponents to maximize 
relative strengths, exploit opponent’s 
weaknesses or gain greater freedom of 
action.”16 Contrary to nation-states 
in the upper echelons of military 
spending, weaker sides in conflict 
must circumvent direct attacks in 
favor of unexpected tactics, due to 
their own shortcomings as well as 
the superiority of their opponent. 
These asymmetric approaches em-
ploy innovative, nontraditional tac-
tics, and weapons or technologies 
that are irregular in nature.17
     Asymmetric threats include a 
variety of tactics, including disin-
formation campaigns, terrorism, 
and cyberattacks. Importantly, these 
tactics exist under the threshold for 
conventional conflict while still de-
stabilizing governments, alliances, 
or organizations.18 According to the 
Ministry of Defense in Serbia, cer-
tain characteristics are inherently 
asymmetric: 
1. considered unusual from a con-
ventional point of view (i.e. tor-
ture); 
2. irregular in the sense that they 
violate treaties or laws of armed 
conflict; 
3. depart from war as previously 
understood, (as in flying planes 
into buildings); 
4. leveraged or specialized against 
assets; 
5. difficult to respond to propor-
tionally, creating a situation 
where military intervention in 
response seems inhumane or 
cruel; 
6. having unforeseen circumstanc-
es, typical of an event or attack 
not previously used.19  
Stephen Blank, a Senior Fellow at 
the Foreign Policy Research In-
stitute and published author on 
asymmetric threats,20 presents an-
other interpretation of asymmetry, 
labeled “Blank’s Theory.”  Blank’s 
Theory classifies asymmetric threats 
within five dimensions: 
1. “they are threats of non-conven-
tional nature; 
2. they are designed to mislead the 
opponent; 
3. they can be used by both state 
and non-state actors; 
4. they do not imply confronta-
tion, and; 
5. they reflect the opponent’s strat-
egy.”21 
In both scenarios, these tactics are 
intangible and entirely flexible, cre-
ating military action that is unpre-




     Hybrid warfare exists in concert 
with asymmetric threats, blending 
conventional and irregular tactics.22 
In this sense, hybrid warfare “...com-
bin[es] military and non-military 
as well as covert and overt means, 
including disinformation, cyber at-
tacks, economic pressure, [and the] 
deployment of irregular armed 
groups and use of regular forces.23 
Franck Hoffman, a Distinguished 
Research Fellow with the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies, builds 
on this definition: he argues that hy-
brid warfare incorporates different 
modes of warfare (both conven-
tional and asymmetric capabilities), 
thereby utilizing synergistic efforts 
that are simultaneous, fused, and 
subordinate to one command unit.24
      According to some military ex-
perts, this unconventional theater 
of conflict can further be described 
as the “Gray Zone” of warfare, char-
acterized by “...intense political, 
economic, informational and mili-
tary competition more fervent than 
steady-state diplomacy, yet short of 
conventional war,” and employing 
“small-footprint, low-visibility opera-
tions often of a covert or clandestine 
nature.”25 This hybrid zone utilizes 
operations below internationally 
recognized thresholds and con-
ventional, on-the-ground tactics. 
Though hybrid tactics are tradition-
ally linked to non-state actors (ter-
rorist organizations, for example) 
waging wars against more powerful 
foes, Hoffman argues that hybrid 
wars neither supplant conventional 
warfare nor relegate future threats 
to sub-state actors.26 To this point, 
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and subsequent cyberattacks, 
media manipulation, and criminal 
agitation have been increasingly cit-
ed by policy experts (and contested 
by many others) as a prominent na-
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tion-state fusing conventional and 
asymmetric means under one com-
mand.27  Additionally, operating in 
the Gray Zone, the United States 
countered the September 11th ter-
rorist attacks with small special 
operation forces (SOF), carrier and 
land-based airstrikes, and indige-
nous Afghan fighters to depose the 
illegitimate Taliban government, 
which was giving refuge to al-Qae-
da.28 Alongside their asymmet-
ric means, the U.S. “boots on the 
ground” presence of roughly 350 
SOF and other operatives made this 
a hybrid approach.29  Either state or 
non-state, consensus acknowledg-
es hybrid warfare’s combination of 
tactics utilized, some conventional 
and some asymmetric, and the stra-
tegically and simultaneously coordi-
nated efforts that are unlike those of 
previous wars.30
The History of Convention-
al Warfare
     At the beginning of the 21st centu-
ry, conventional warfare was loosely 
defined as “the confrontation of two 
or more countries to defeat the other 
by means of armed forces and win-
ner’s dictation of peace conditions”. 
31 More specifically, conventional 
warfare can be examined as mili-
tary action supported by economic 
pressure, information relations, and 
diplomacy from the state. Through 
conventional political channels the 
government guides operations, the 
population provides the productive 
means, and the military uses them 
in conflict.32
     This strategy has largely defined 
historical warfare. In 1945, United 
States forces under the command 
of General Douglas MacArthur ap-
proached Manila, the capital of the 
Philippines, in an attempt to erad-
icate the Japanese presence from 
the archipelago.33 The defending 
Japanese forces were strongly and 
relentlessly committed to holding 
the city. In the face of tremendous 
ground casualties, American air 
commanders persisted in request-
ing General MacArthur to approve 
aerial bombardment to assist U.S. 
ground troops. MacArthur repeat-
edly denied the request, stating that 
while Japanese forces would like-
ly be killed, so too would innocent 
Filippino civilians.34 Without aerial 
support, both sides suffered heavy 
casualties, though the United States 
prevailed in capturing the city. 
Nonetheless, MacArthur argued, 
the world would have reacted in 
horror had the U.S. employed aerial 
forces.35 Circumventing the princi-
ples of conventional warfare was an 
unacceptable cost.
     The complex history of war pro-
vides context for this reluctance to 
engage in any tactics deemed “ir-
regular.” Constructed in academic 
literature, warfare is classified into 
four distinct “generations” (five 
phases).36 Each generation features 
radically different warfare strategy. 
The tactics used in Manila have few 
parallels to the methods embraced 
by modern Iraqi fighters.  The gen-
erations include:  
1. Wars before nation-states;
2. “Classical Warfare” (Generation 
1), including the Napoleon-
ic wars: lined arrangements of 
musketmen on battlefields;
3. “All Together Industry” (Gener-
ation 2), including World War 
I: the industrial revolution and 
wider railroad availability ush-
ered in auxiliary and infantry 
units;
4. “Maneuver Wars” (Generation 
3), extending back to WWII: 
“blitzkrieg” strategies, which 
targeted the weakest part of the 
enemy;
5. “Unconventional Wars” (Gener-
ation 4), including the aftermath 
of September 11th and the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.37
As evidenced above, the fourth gen-
eration departs quite extremely from 
the tactics of prior wars and en-
compasses asymmetric and hybrid 
methods unique to modern conflict. 
A 1989 article in the Marine Corps 
Gazette (a professional journal for 
the US Marines disseminating mili-
tary art and science) introduced the 
concept of “fourth generation war-
fare.” Here, “...warfare seems likely 
to be widely dispersed and largely 
undefined; the distinction between 
war and peace will be blurred to the 
vanishing point.  It will be nonlinear, 
possibly to the point of having no de-
finable battlefields or fronts.  Also, 
the distinction between ‘civilian’ and 
‘military’ may disappear.”38 This cen-
ters on the ability of weaker powers 
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to combine conventional and ir-
regular tactics to pose a legitimate 
threat to an opponent’s political 
will. As such, the fourth generation 
(constituting hybrid warfare) does 
not attempt to win by defeating an 
enemy’s military forces, but through 
hybrid tactics aimed at an enemy’s 
political will.39
Warfare’s Transition
     As warfare progresses, the ques-
tion remains: why are asymmetric 
and hybrid strategies dominating 
global conflict? Curiously, the an-
swer lies in defensive efforts against 
these tactics: extreme discrepan-
cies between actors’ military capa-
bilities has incentivized the use of 
asymmetric and hybrid threats.40 
In other words, there is a disparity 
between actors with the capacity to 
accumulate large armies and those 
without. This has created an envi-
ronment where less powerful actors 
must engage in hybrid tactics to re-
duce the disparity.41 The U.S. and its 
allies best represent this, with their 
national budgets constituting 40% 
and roughly a third of global spend-
ing.42 “Weaker” nation-states, which 
includes almost everyone else, can-
not compete through convention-
al channels with the West. Thus, 
historical wars pitting two nations 
against each other on a battlefield 
have been rendered obsolete.
     Inequality in military capacity is 
not the lone transforming force: the 
doctrine of mutually assured destruc-
tion (MAD) is an evolutionary de-
fense strategy based on the concept 
that “neither the United States nor its 
enemies will ever start a nuclear war 
because the other side will retaliate 
massively and unacceptably,”43 po-
tentially with nuclear weapons. This 
doctrine applies narrowly to nations 
of nuclear capacity, yet serves as an 
additional deterrent to conventional 
war. In sum, post-Cold War society 
has forced state and non-state actors 
to pursue irregular tactics in war-
fare to combat an escalating arms 
race between opposing ideological 
blocs. These conditions are directly 
responsible for the transition away 
from conventional warfare, and 
their maintenance on a global scale 
will only serve as additional encour-
agement for the usage of asymmet-
ric threats and hybrid tactics.
     Though conventional war has 
seen a decline in modern conflict, 
it remains in use by global powers 
against weaker nations and vice 
versa. Demonstrated by the trends 
outlined above, this type of war-
fare is becoming difficult, outdat-
ed, and ineffective against irregular 
opponents. Nonetheless, especially 
alongside hybrid tactics, conven-
tional warfare can be advantageous. 
The U.S. government engaged in 
aspects of conventional warfare 
against the Ba’athist government in 
Iraq.44 This nation-state against na-
tion-state, enemy-specific attack was 
replicated to an extent in Crimea in 
2014, where Russian troops invaded 
the peninsula and combined hybrid 
with conventional tactics.45 These 
examples demonstrate increasing 
hybrid tactics, but also the need for 
nations to remain vigilant against 
conventional ones. 
Actors of Warfare
     From the perspective of conflict 
analysis, actors in warfare are all 
those engaged in or being affected by 
conflict, otherwise considered “who 
intervenes.”46 John McDonald, a for-
mer U.S. Ambassador, diplomat, 
and peacebuilding expert, intro-
duced the concept of “Multi-Track 
Diplomacy” which distinguished 
nine tracks of conflict-resolution 
and expanded on a previous list of 
actors in conflict.  Despite the ex-
panded list, McDonald maintained 
Multi-Track Diplacy’s foundation 
of two central sub-groups: official 
states/governments and unofficial, 
non governmental and non-state 
groups.47 For the purpose of this pa-
per, actors will refer to these large 
sub-groups, characterizing each ac-
tor as being tied (or not tied) to a 
sovereign nation, therefore as “state” 
or “non-state.” Though state actors 
are capable (and willing) to organize 
asymmetric efforts, their position 
on asymmetric conflict generally 
differs from that of non-states and 
therefore is considered separately. 
     The state contains traditional mil-
itary and political authority which 
relies on its own economic and diplo-
matic power.48 Comparatively, non-
state actors employ a non-hierarchi-
cal structure of motivated “cells” with 
common motivations and political 
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goals.49 This compartmentalization 
works in favor of organizations such 
as terrorist groups that must leave 
potential vulnerabilities decentral-
ized. State and non-state actors are 
inherently different, crucially so in 
regards to sovereignty: according 
to a report released by the National 
Intelligence Council, non-state ac-
tors are non-sovereign entities and 
therefore are not legitimized on a 
global stage.50 Nonetheless, under-
standing both actors is vital to any 
discussion surrounding asymmetric 
and hybrid warfare. Russia, a pow-
erful nation-state, and the Islamic 
State, a terrorist non-state actor, op-
erate vastly differently despite both 
engaging in hybrid and asymmetric 
tactics, and both must be under-
stood in prospective defensive ef-
forts.
State Actors
     State-actors represent the tra-
ditional consolidation of authori-
ty and the central elements of the 
international system.51 Defined by 
Higher School of Economics Pro-
fessor Timofei Bordachev, a state is 
a politically organized body of people 
at an established territory with pub-
lic authority and the legal use of force 
and violence.52 This monopoly on vi-
olence differentiates sovereign states 
from other actors that lack similar 
territory or authority.53 Importantly, 
nations must be recognized by oth-
er sovereign states through interna-
tional channels, such as the United 
Nations, to achieve this status. Fur-
ther, the state must have public au-
thority, governing tools, and territo-
ry and population to rule.54 Legality 
aside, certain states exercise con-
flict beyond their borders, wield-
ing armies large enough to warrant 
conventional conflict or relying on 
hybrid and asymmetric means to 
circumvent international laws that 
would inflict potential consequenc-
es. 
State Actors: Libya and Rus-
sia 
     Nation-states are capable of abus-
ing asymmetric tactics to achieve 
political goals, as exemplified by the 
Libyan Civil War between the inter-
nationally recognized Government 
of National Accord and the Libyan 
National Army.55 Neighboring na-
tions and global powers have be-
come increasingly involved in the 
conflict through asymmetric tac-
tics. For example, both Turkey and 
Russia have trained mercenaries to 
be dispatched in Libya.56 Elsewhere, 
Turkey and the UAE have contin-
ued devastating airstrikes, jockey-
ing over (what some consider) the 
largest drone war in the world.57 
Disinformation campaigns have in-
creased alongside physical strikes, 
particularly through bots and trolls 
deployed by Russia, the UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia in favor of the Libyan 
National Army.58 These develop-
ments demonstrate modern “wars 
at distance”: technology, social me-
dia, proxy wars, and private armies 
of mercenaries allow states to par-
ticipate in conflict and destabilize 
opposing governments without ac-
tively engaging in the carnage. 
     Whereas the Libyan conflict fea-
tured nation-states and non-state 
actors in coordination, Russia’s ag-
gressive international actions have 
demonstrated the capability for a 
state to execute hybrid and asym-
metric attacks without international 
assistance or a pre-existing conflict. 
Through tactics of disinformation, 
cyberwarfare, and support for for-
eign political movements, Russia 
has tactfully played the line below 
conventional war.59 In 2017, a dis-
information campaign, widely be-
lieved to have originated in Russia, 
falsely accused German soldiers 
deployed in Lithuania of raping a 
teenage girl, stirring anti-soldier 
sentiments.60 Elsewhere, Russian 
disinformation efforts have target-
ed the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) partner countries 
to undermine citizen’s support for 
joining the alliance, in addition to 
cyberattacks targeting the Demo-
cratic National Convention in the 
United States, leaking vulnerable 
information online that jeopardized 
U.S election security.61 In these sce-
narios, Russian efforts sought desta-
bilization, manipulation of citizens, 
and vulnerability in nations Rus-
sia considers as global foes. This is 
further evident in overt and covert 
Russian support for political groups, 
their funding of a French far-right 
national group, and aiding networks 
of non-governmental organizations 
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shifting European public opinion 
towards a positive view of Russian 
politics.62
     Russia is just one example of a 
prominent nation-state engaging in 
hybrid tactics. Both in states with 
the capabilities for conventional 
warfare and those who fight proxy 
wars abroad, asymmetric threats 
have proven effective in causing 
mass disruption to national govern-
ments and supra-national organi-
zations. Thus, as their effectiveness 
remains consistent on a global stage 
and their methods remain below 
the threshold for conventional war, 
defense strategies must be adjusted 
to fully combat asymmetric means, 
and security experts must acknowl-
edge the threat that nation-states 
pose. 
Non-State Actors
     Non-state actors are defined as 
“non-sovereign entities that exercise 
political, economic, or social” control 
at either a national or internation-
al level.63 These actors operate out-
side the confines of a conventional 
state, pursuing their political agen-
das through means more difficult to 
contain or regulate. Forming a con-
sensus on non-state actors has prov-
en difficult for scholars and national 
governments alike. Nonetheless, a 
flexible list includes the following, 
per the United States National Intel-
ligence Council:
1. multinational corporations and 
organizations;





This is not a summative list, but 
rather an introduction to several 
non-state actors in global politics. 
However, in the context of hybrid 
warfare, terrorist organizations and 
criminal networks participate as the 
most important actors.    
     In examining conflict, two main 
groups of non-state actors can be 
identified in accordance with their 
operating tendencies. Non-violent 
non-state actors, including multina-
tional corporations, can have pro-
found effects on a nation’s economic 
or political state, with the potential to 
also exert harmful influence or un-
due control over a region.65 Violent 
non-state actors, however, generally 
present national and international 
consequences of extreme magnitude, 
and are characterized by their ability 
to rely on violence and force through 
asymmetrical channels.66 Militias, 
warlords, insurgents, terrorist and 
criminal gangs, and transnational 
criminal groups all exemplify the 
range of violent non-state actors.67 
As previously theorized, the usage 
of asymmetric and hybrid threats 
stems from a disadvantaged mili-
tary position, where non-state ac-
tors or weaker states must approach 
warfare through irregular and un-
expected tactics to sustain victory. 
This becomes evident when exam-
ining specific examples of non-state 
actors and their methods, such as 
terrorist organizations operating in 
the Middle East, Africa, or South-
east Asia. 
Non-State Actors: Terrorist 
Organizations
     On September 11th, 2001, the 
actualization of asymmetric threats 
posed by non-state actors was ful-
ly realized. Hijacking commercial 
aircrafts and piloting them towards 
buildings symbolizing the glob-
al authority of the U.S. departed 
quite extremely from warfare in 
the trenches, and this shifted U.S. 
foreign policy to the primary role 
of counterterrorism.68 The admin-
istration of President George W. 
Bush declared a “War on Terror,” 
gathered information and targeted 
the terrorist non-state actors re-
sponsible, which represented the 
United States’ own effort in hybrid 
warfare and dealing with non-state 
actors.69 U.S. forces operated in the 
previously defined “Gray Zone,” de-
ploying SOF, carrier and land-based 
airstrikes, and irregular Afghan 
fighters to depose the illegitimate 
Taliban government, which was 
giving refuge to al-Qaeda.70 Despite 
fighting occurring largely in the na-
tion-states of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the perceived threats from U.S. strat-
egy were al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
emphasizing the role that non-state 
actors can play in global conflict and 
their complicated relationship with 
nation-states.71
     The September 11th terrorist 
attacks and subsequent geopoliti-
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cal consequences modeled an in-
creasing fusion of non-state and 
state forces. This created a gap in 
contemporary military terminolo-
gy and strategy filled today by the 
widely utilized “asymmetric and 
hybrid threats.”72 Neither terrorism, 
the organizations behind these at-
tacks, nor tactics in the following 
Afghan invasion were unknown to 
the US in 2001. However, combin-
ing conventional “on the ground” 
military action (such as the deploy-
ment of U.S. SOFs) with irregular 
methods of insurgency, war on in-
formation, and cyber attacks rep-
resented a departure from previous 
military strategy.73 Further, despite 
frequent terrorist activity both pri-
or to and since September 11th, this 
awoke much of the world to poten-
tial threats posed by terrorist—and 
generally non-state—actors such as 
al-Qaeda and presently the Islamic 
State. 
Platforms of  Warfare
After the dramatic arrival of asym-
metric threats in global conflict, 
national defense strategies eagerly 
rushed to identify and address po-
tential tactics. This proclivity ran 
counter to an actual comprehen-
sion of the term: asymmetry quickly 
came to define every threat faced in 
international conflict, and this care-
less application rendered the con-
cept useless.74 Substantive critique 
from academics contested the label 
of threats themselves as asymmet-
ric, instead of the nature of strate-
gies utilized.75 In reference to “plat-
forms” of asymmetric and hybrid 
warfare, this paper seeks to identify 
and address this complaint.
     The idea of “platforms of warfare” 
is not widely addressed in academia, 
and this makes asymmetric tactics 
difficult to reliably quantify. There-
fore, this paper looks to introduce 
the concept of platforms of warfare 
as an overarching classification of 
asymmetric threats characterized by 
the nature of the threat utilized. This 
definition relies on the logic that 
asymmetric and hybrid tactics, or 
“means” exist within a greater con-
ceptual platform. For example, a cy-
ber attack is an asymmetric threat 
dependent on computer technolo-
gy and communication networks. 
From this, cyber attacks can be de-
termined to exist within the plat-
form of information warfare.
     Beyond this, this paper looks to 
acknowledge a platform widely uti-
lized today and referenced above: 
information warfare. This example 
is not an all-encompassing list; sev-
eral other platforms exist, notably 
terrorist activity. To maintain the 
scope of this paper, however, infor-
mation warfare will be briefly ex-
plored while cyberattacks, a central 
asymmetric threat within that plat-




     The past few decades have revolu-
tionized information and commu-
nication technologies in society, in-
troducing modern telephones, radio 
signals, and satellites. To optimize 
military strategy, warfare has shift-
ed alongside technology: broadly, 
information warfare is a struggle 
over these information and commu-
nication systems, and the application 
of destructive force on a large scale 
against information assets and sys-
tems and against the computers and 
networks that support this critical in-
frastructure.76  These increased com-
munication systems have created a 
societal reliance on them, leaving 
organizations potentially vulnerable 
to information warfare that damages 
or freezes their networks. However, 
increased communication systems 
can be similarly favorable to offen-
sive information attacks: whereas 
once information was a tool of the 
state, (in certain nations it remains 
that way) asymmetric opponents 
today wield the power to make and 
distribute their own information to 
much wider audiences. 77 This ability 
has ushered in new areas of conflict 
operation, enabled states to engage 
in mass disinformation campaigns, 
and allowed wars to be fought re-
motely behind a monitor.78  
     Commonly utilized by rogue 
nations or non-state actors seeking 
destabilization, cyberattacks and 
cyberwarfare are central to informa-
tion warfare. These tactics represent 
a particularly advantageous strat-
egy due to the limited assets they 
require: with secure networks and 
infrastructure, actors can leverage 
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massive disruption and destabilize 
government networks, elections, or 
the networks of supranational or-
ganizations from abroad.79 This ca-
pability of “warfare from abroad” 
allows states to conceal their actions 
or motives, avoid international con-
sequences (such as sanctions), or 
prevent the carnage possible in con-
ventional intervention.  
     During the Kosovo War in 1999, 
Serbian hackers, in concert with 
their Eastern European sympathiz-
ers, launched global attacks aimed 
at shutting down key computer sys-
tems in NATO countries.80 Despite 
knowledge that this attack was not 
sufficient to win the war, the Serbs 
successfully stalled the NATO of-
fensive and disabled temporary 
response and communication sys-
tems.81 These cyberattacks are ru-
dimentary compared to the infor-
mation warfare used today: among 
other nation-states and non-state 
actors, China and Russia are capable 
of waging catastrophic cyber attacks 
on rival states, vastly more damag-
ing than those utilized by Serbia in 
1999. With disinformation cam-
paigns, trained cyber experts, and 
the world’s increasing reliance on 
global networks, these powers have 
many vulnerable targets to exploit 
and will continue to do so under the 
threshold of warfare.  
     As mentioned previously, infor-
mation warfare is not the lone plat-
form of asymmetric means.  Though 
broad in scope, terrorism represents 
another.  This includes attacks lev-
eraged by terrorist organizations, 
though terrorism may also result 
from state-waged violence through 
the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, biological weapons, attacks on 
critical infrastructure that society 
depends on, or from attacks on peo-
ple and government institutions.82 
The threat of terrorism continues to 
loom large over the Western world, 
especially as military accumulation 
forces non-state actors to utilize ir-
regular tactics.  Therefore, this plat-
form must be addressed as fever-
ently as information warfare in an 
effort to stall its global rise.
Asymmetric Threat Case 
Study: Cyber Attacks
     Cyber operations and their role 
in conflict represent a dramatic shift 
in society over the past few decades. 
Under the veil of anonymity and the 
threshold for conventional conflict, 
cyber attacks are an emerging asym-
metric threat being utilized to create 
great destruction. Academia hosts 
several definitions for the concept 
of cyberattacks, though specifically 
for this paper cyber attacks refer to 
“...hostile acts using computer or re-
lated networks to disrupt or destroy 
an adversary’s cyber systems or func-
tions.”83 Whereas cyber attacks refer 
to isolated incidents, cyberwarfare 
expands upon this concept as “...
massively coordinated digital as-
saults on one government by another 
or by large groups of citizens, as when 
cyber attacks are orchestrated by 
state-sponsored hackers against an-
other nation’s cyber infrastructure.”84 
Examining these concepts, there are 
generally three targets of cyberwar-
fare: 
1. information itself; 
2. information based processes 
that collect, analyze, and dis-
seminate material of the state; 
3. the infrastructure of informa-
tion and communication sys-
tems that collect, process, store, 
transmit, display, disseminate, 
and act on said material.85
The utilization of cyber methods 
against these targets offer actors 
operational flexibility, convenience, 
and undue authority. Computer 
attacks can be launched remote-
ly or anonymously so as to avoid 
direct consequence, while their 
non-physical existence offers less 
able nation-states to be equally 
disruptive as their more-powerful 
counterparts. Whereas traditional 
warfare required a level of capabil-
ity to launch an attack, cyber meth-
ods have created a sphere of conflict 
where power can be utilized by a 
wide array of political instigators 
for damaging purposes.86 From this, 
defending national security systems 
proves difficult, especially consider-
ing how many potential threats exist; 
terrorist organizations, disgruntled 
individuals, or even hostile nation 
states can overpower cyber systems 
manned by limited numbers. 
     In recent decades, Russia has 
utilized cyber attacks as a means 
of promoting its political agenda 
abroad. In some instances, these 
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tactics are combined with conven-
tional conflict in the form of hybrid 
warfare. In 2007, following a dispute 
between the Estonian and Russian 
governments, pro-Kremlin forces 
froze Estonian networks. This cy-
ber barrage was asymmetric in na-
ture and orchestrated by non-state 
actors, thereby distanced from the 
Russian state itself.87  The follow-
ing year amidst the Russo-Geor-
gian War, Russian criminal gangs 
attacked multiple Georgian govern-
ment targets, marking the first time 
that a known cyber attack had co-
incided with shooting in war.88 This 
utilization of asymmetric means 
alongside conventional strategy ex-
plicitly demonstrates hybrid war-
fare. 
     North Korea is an additional pro-
ponent of cyber attacks. Lacking 
strategic advantages of large enlist-
ment numbers, foreign investments, 
and advanced technical equipment, 
North Korea uses asymmetric strat-
egies to offset warfare disparities 
against more powerful opponents.89 
This has made cyber attacks a 
strong strategy for North Korea: cy-
ber attacks can be conducted from 
abroad, require limited assets, and 
rely on little manpower to wreak 
considerable havoc abroad. Further, 
North Korea leverages their detach-
ment from global cyber networks to 
manipulate cyber attacks as a viable 
strategy.90
     Recognizing their reliance on 
cyber attacks, the North Kore-
an national government has made 
considerable efforts to funnel their 
brightest students into computer 
hacking and cyberwarfare opera-
tions. Government officials select 
promising students in mathematics 
to learn computer-based warfare. 
These students are then trained in 
specialized organizations before en-
tering computer hacking forces, the 
most prestigious of which is known 
as the Bureau 121. Forces like these 
have been successful in enabling 
North Korea to engage in asymmet-
ric combat from a distance, in solic-
iting funds for national use, and in 
incapacitating enemies of their ide-
ology.91
     In February 2016, $101 million 
dollars were taken from a New York 
Federal Reserve account that be-
longed to the Bangladesh Central 
Bank. A single spelling error on a 
withdrawal request raised the alarm 
that prevented the initial request of 
$1 billion from being authorized. 
This attack, later found to have oc-
curred in banks in over ten other 
nations, was eventually discovered 
to have come from North Korea. 
However, due to a lack of physical 
evidence, the funds were never re-
covered and are potentially in cir-
culation in North Korean markets.92 
This attack demonstrates the signifi-
cant capabilities of cyber attacks and 
the flexibility of their use. Rogue na-
tion-states or non-state actors wield 
the capability to freeze networks, 
shut down entire governments, or 
steal significant sums of money, all 
without direct conflict, under the 
threshold of warfare, and without 
global repercussions. 
Responses to Asymmetric 
and Hybrid Threats
     Modern conflict’s shift to asym-
metric and hybrid tactics represents 
one of the most pressing matters in 
global security. Following the ar-
rival of these tactics on the interna-
tional stage, defense doctrines and 
recommendations were released by 
national and supranational govern-
ing bodies to outline methods of 
prevention. These responses were 
preliminary in nature and are being 
continually evaluated to more prop-
erly address evolving threats. For 
example, increasing Russian hybrid 
activity has alarmed nations in Eu-
rope and NATO into further hybrid 
warfare prevention.93 As these issues 
continue to disrupt global process-
es, effective responses become in-
creasingly crucial for international 
security and must comprehensively 
address and alleviate threats posed 
by asymmetric tactics.  
     In addressing responses to asym-
metric and hybrid threats, this pa-
per will outline current European 
procedure. Though response strat-
egies to these threats will vary de-
pending on the nature of conflict to 
specific regions, European alliances, 
specifically NATO, have formulated 
comparatively advanced response 
systems that will be discussed as 
models for other global regions to 
utilize. These responses may not ap-
ply uniformly, especially consider-
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ing NATO’s status as a supranational 
organization. Nonetheless, the prin-
ciples that they rely on are crucial to 
combating asymmetric threats on a 
global level.  
NATO’s Response Strategy
     At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, 
NATO presented their Compre-
hensive Approach Action Plan, a 
framework to mobilize military and 
civilian resources as resistance to 
hybrid challenges.94 This represent-
ed a crucial first step in acknowl-
edging the threat of asymmetric and 
hybrid tactics, which to that point 
had not entered the public sphere. 
In December of 2015, this progress 
continued: NATO adopted a strat-
egy of confronting hybrid threats 
by increased partnership with the 
European Union (EU). This part-
nership included information shar-
ing between member states, warn-
ing signs of hybrid threats at the 
alliance’s border, and encouraging 
members to recognize potential vul-
nerabilities within their own system 
to Russian interference.95
     In recent years, joint-defense ef-
forts have been expanded by both 
EU and NATO officials. The two al-
liances have coordinated response 
strategies and established centers 
dedicated to the analysis and devel-
opment of hybrid defense, among 
them the European Center of Ex-
cellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats. This coordination relays 
joint declarations and recommen-
dations to member states, calls on 
individual national governments to 
identify internal weaknesses, and 
encourages members to contrib-
ute to a greater security threshold 
in Europe. Despite these promising 
advancements, it remains true that 
NATO defense strategies are not be-
ing optimized and they face institu-
tional challenges to success. 
     Though NATO and the EU have 
pledged cooperation in their war 
on asymmetry, their efforts remain 
stalled by a lack of funding, a lack 
of membership commitment, and 
lack of information sharing.96  In sit-
uations of pressing hybrid challeng-
es, this lack of information sharing 
across organizations ensures a less 
effective response. Worse still, even 
attempts to promote information 
sharing within the organizations 
has proved challenging. For ex-
ample, despite Russian cyber and 
disinformation attacks on the U.S. 
2016 election, the nation shared lit-
tle information with fellow NATO 
members.97 Fundamentally, this 
hesitance makes sense: even with 
allies, states are reluctant to discuss 
internal vulnerabilities. Nonethe-
less, this approach to information 
sharing has stunted the alliance’s 
ability to appropriately respond to 
hybrid threats and create uniform 
responses to urgent issues.98
     Further, despite centers posi-
tioned to address asymmetric and 
hybrid threats, NATO’s identifica-
tion policy is unclear. In modern 
conflict, hybrid forces are common-
ly fused with conventional warfare 
and oftentimes exist without un-
derlying conflict. Despite this com-
mon occurrence, NATO’s internal 
framework addressing these conflict 
levels has no concrete response.99 
In addition, response strategies are 
stalled by NATO members’ varying 
perceptions of threat in regards to 
asymmetric tactics. Nation-states 
susceptible to Russian influence 
in Eastern Europe may call for in-
creased protections against infor-
mation warfare, while nation-states 
overwhelmed by migration from 
the Middle East in Southern Europe 
may wish to adjust their focus to 
criminal activity. NATO must find a 
way to blend their response strate-
gies to fit this range of issues, or else 
remain fractured and pulled along 
by their member’s diverse interests. 
Ultimately, however, it proves diffi-
cult to organize an alliance on a sin-
gle issue in the face of many.  
Recommendations to Asym-
metric and Hybrid Threats
     While malicious state and non-
state actors continue to engage in 
asymmetric and hybrid tactics, oth-
er global actors must not be com-
plicit in their progress and must 
recognize necessary procedures to 
be enacted. Proactively, this recog-
nition must translate to policy and 
definite changes. Therefore, this 
paper will identify several recom-
mendations to effectively challenge 
asymmetric tactics in modern so-
ciety. As European responses to hy-
brid warfare were outlined above, 
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a NATO-specific recommendation 
will be discussed. However, as rec-
ommendations are crucial to regions 
that do not already have functioning 
response systems to hybrid threats, 
generalized recommendation strat-
egies will also be addressed.
     NATO principally relies on its 
stated articles to govern and direct 
the alliance. These articles, meant to 
provide guidance in times of crises, 
are not being effectively enforced in 
a unified defense strategy. Article 
4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the 
treaty that established NATO) states 
that parties (nation-states) will con-
sult together when, in the opinion 
of any member, the political inde-
pendence or security of a member 
is threatened.100 As previously men-
tioned, certain NATO members 
have not been transparent in their 
struggles with hybrid threats, par-
ticularly when it exposes vulnera-
bilities in a nation’s infrastructure 
or defense capabilities. Nonetheless, 
the alliance must invoke Article 4 to 
enable these difficult consultations 
and to properly address areas in al-
liance security where foreign actors 
may be meddling. To respond ef-
fectively, individual nations should 
develop “internal thresholds” that 
identify asymmetric threats.101 
When crossed, this should serve as 
an alarm to bring the issue to the 
awareness of other NATO mem-
bers. Then, NATO should facilitate 
consultations that organize effective 
responses to hybrid operations. In 
doing so, a NATO-wide response 
team to assist member-states strug-
gling with conflict would be incred-
ibly constructive for the alliance go-
ing forward.102
     Elsewhere in the world, espe-
cially in regions plagued by ter-
rorist activity or struggling with 
governmental infrastructure vul-
nerabilities, responses to hybrid 
and asymmetric threats are crucial 
in securing national defense. These 
recommendations are not nation- 
or alliance-specific, but rather they 
represent actions that would be ben-
eficial outside the scope of an inter-
national organization or any indi-
vidual nation-state. 
     For an effective national response 
to asymmetric threats, response 
mechanisms must be institutional-
ized. There is no universal solution 
to asymmetric threats; even among 
related means, such as chemical and 
biological warfare, responses differ 
greatly and can complicate defense 
strategies. Therefore, responses 
must be institutionalized by the na-
tional military and governing bod-
ies: in doing so, doctrine, strategy, 
structure of armed forces, and train-
ing must be addressed in policy and 
procedure to ensure a timely and 
effective response to hybrid attacks. 
Furthermore, understanding that 
variable asymmetric means warrant 
varying responses, an integrated 
and institutionalized defense effort 
should incorporate two primary ef-
forts: protection and threat manage-
ment. In other words, though each 
unique type of asymmetric attack 
calls for its own individualized re-
sponse, a national system must be 
organized with responses catego-
rized by defensive protections ver-
sus proactive threat management. 
Defensively, this would establish 
procedures in the scenario of an 
incoming or on-going asymmetric 
attack, whereas coordinating threat 
management systems would at-
tempt to prevent any attacks from 
materializing. These efforts should 
be coordinated with allied states and 
national partners to standardize re-
sponses globally.103
     Specific to Africa , several ad-
ditional recommendations will be 
made to secure nations from im-
pending hybrid and asymmetric 
threats. Some of these threats are 
contingent on region-specific qual-
ities, however the recommendations 
are applicable to a global audience. 
     First, nations should revisit and 
revise their threat-response mech-
anisms.104 Threats often assume a 
transnational capacity, exposing 
weaknesses in the state. Therefore, 
existing institutions and defense ap-
proaches need to constantly adapt 
to emerging threats as they appear. 
In states that are particularly frag-
mented or with less centralized gov-
ernments, this revision and policy-
making process should include the 
involvement of local or religious 
leaders who would be most knowl-
edgeable of the threats their com-
munity faces.105 Next, the coordina-
tion of efforts and existing strategies 
is imperative for a successful de-
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fense system. This revisits the issue 
of government fragmentation or 
decentralization: it is possible that 
within government bodies of a state, 
information sharing and commu-
nication procedures are ineffective. 
To improve response systems, such 
information gaps and disconnects 
must be narrowed, and intelligence 
sharing should be streamlined to be 
efficient and effective in the face of 
emergency threats.106 As part of the 
information process, warning net-
works and response mechanisms 
should be established and opti-
mized. However, these mechanisms 
will only alert the acting government 
of a potential threat. Following this 
realization of a present or potential 
national security risk, there must be 
some state capacity to respond to or 
prevent any such threat from mate-
rializing. This may be in the form of 
increased national intelligence orga-
nizational capacity, increased num-
ber of staff of intelligence operatives 
and state employees, stronger cyber 
infrastructure, or increased military 
capability to deter armed threats.107
     As part of the necessity for state 
capacity, it is recommended that 
nations improve their infrastruc-
ture as a means of defense. The lack 
of a self-sufficient economy or re-
liable infrastructure leaves states 
vulnerable to crises or attacks. For 
example, an attack of biological 
warfare might be more effective and 
spread more thoroughly in a state 
with inadequate health care.108 As 
a final recommendation, both for 
states defending against asymmetric 
threats and those that utilize them 
in conflict, the ability to resolve con-
flict without intervention, warfare 
methods, or illegal channels is im-
portant to global peace. Internation-
al diplomacy, economic relations, 
and strategic policymaking must 
be more accessible and effective. 
For non-state actors and nations to 
abandon asymmetric means, there 
must be legal channels for their po-
litical agendas to be processed.This 
should exist through international 
organizations, alliances, and coun-
cils meant to support weaker states. 
Conclusion
     Albert Einstein once said “You 
cannot simultaneously prevent and 
prepare for war.”109  In conceptual-
izing the role of modern asymmet-
ric and hybrid threats, this paradox 
of warfare rears its head. As na-
tion-states compete to accumulate 
arms and deter conventional attacks, 
less capable actors will increasingly 
revert to asymmetric means to ex-
ercise their political aspirations and 
disrupt more powerful foes. To com-
bat this, nation-states and supra-na-
tional organizations such as NATO 
must establish and refine response 
systems to defend against these tac-
tics.  Utilizing the recommendations 
above, states should institutionalize 
their responses, streamline infor-
mation-sharing procedures, and de-
velop stable infrastructure to allow 
for increased state capacity. Most 
importantly, diplomatic means and 
resolutions must be developed be-
yond intervention or asymmetric 
means. The global security realm 
must not be complacent in its battle 
against asymmetric war and war-
fare’s constant development. Other-
wise, as states develop the capacity 
to defend against current methods 
of cyberattacks or terrorism, other 
means of warfare will simply arise 
to take their place.
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This photo was taken in historic East Berlin.
Photo by Lydia Weinberger, Class of 2021
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El Camino de Santiago is a world-renowned backpacking trail in the north of Spain that dates back to the 8th 
century, when pilgrims first traveled to the burial site of James the Apostle in what is now the town of Santiago de 
Compostela. The trail weaves through major cities, small towns, barren fields, and foggy woods alike as travelers 
experience all the beauty and culture that Northern Spain has to offer. This photo was taken at Sarria, a town in 
Galicia, Spain. 
Photo by Andres Otero, Class of 2021
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A picture of Thean Hou Temple, a Buddhist temple dedicated to Mazu, a Chinese sea goddess. Built by the 
Hainanese community in Malaysia, who are originally from southern China. Photo taken at Kuala Lumpur, Malay-
sia. 
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Chemistry, Class of 2021
